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by Adam Bink

(Editor’s note: Adam Bink blogs at OpenLeft.com. He was in Maine helping the No on 1 campaign try to retain the right to marry in an initiative battle similar to Prop 8. On Nov. 3, the campaign lost 53 percent to 47 percent. Here is his analysis. – Karen Ocamb)
In reflecting on the No on 1 campaign in Maine, I think there are a number of things that could be done better in the future and a number of things that should be kept the same. There are also a few things moving us forward, even in the wake of our loss.
In the can-be-done-better department:
1. Turnout and field. The expectation in and outside the campaign was that the higher turnout was, the more likely we were to win. Turnout was at 58.5 percent—beating a state record for an odd-year election by seven points—and we still lost by six. While we met or exceeded our overall vote goals in many places, there were simply more voters on their side. This is a long-term issue we must keep in mind, and is indicative of persuasion work in the movement that remains to be done. In operations, there was a focus on door knocks over voter contacts and not enough organizing in small towns where we lost by dramatic margins. None of these items alone would have led to a win, but are critical to keep in mind for the future.
2. Tunnel vision by progressive allies. The day before election day, I received an e-mail asking for contributions 1) to support the 2010 re-election of Rep. Alan Grayson of Florida; 2) from the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee asking for help to “support our Democratic majority” in the 2010 elections; 3) and from Organizing for America (OFA), which is an arm of the Democratic National Committee, absurdly asking me to “share a brief story about your best memory of the final days of the [2008] campaign.” There is no excuse for distracting attention from get-out-the-vote efforts in the final two days of the campaign with these kinds of appeals.
3. Refusal to help from the White House and OFA. The White House issued a tepid statement opposing Question 1 without actually mentioning the words “Maine,” “No” or “Question 1,” or anything that would have actually influenced voters. Then OFA sent e-mails to Maine voters asking them to vote, but did not ask for a No vote on Question 1. Then OFA sent e-mails to Maine voters asking them to call New Jersey voters to support Gov. Corzine. This was later admitted by openly gay DNC Treasurer Andrew Tobias to be an insensitive mistake. The DNC contributed $25,000 to fight Prop. 8, and was asked by Stonewall Democrats to contribute the same to No On 1, but refused. There was no apology for any of these oversights. There is no excuse for the Democratic Party and the White House not fighting more forcefully for core LGBT values.
In the what-should-stay-the-same department, there is a debate over whether these marriage campaigns are winnable. Because No on Prop. 8 ran a terrible campaign and lost, and No on 1 ran a near-flawless campaign and lost, the problem—the argument goes—isn’t execution but that these campaigns aren’t winnable until demographics change, e.g. older, more culturally conservative people become a smaller percentage of the electorate.
The other argument is that the initiative-game is fixed because many states have ballot referenda on minority civil rights, which amounts to tyranny of the majority.
Both points are important, but I strongly disagree with the attitude that these campaigns are not winnable in the short-term. A better No on 8 campaign could have won. But more to the point, this lamenting discourages participation in these fights at a time when we need more people active than ever.
Our movement needs more people involved in these fights, needs more people to heed Harvey Milk’s call to come out of the closet and more straight allies to tell stories of their gay family members, friends and colleagues. The rules of this game are set, and we must play within them. We can win, and we must keep trying.
What did we accomplish? We moved the ball forward perhaps without realizing it. A colleague of mine who ran a 1995 LGBT ballot campaign in Maine said that campaign was won by hiding LGBT families. The No on 8 ads attempted the same thing.
But the No on 1 campaign ads included actual stories of families with same-sex parents. Their photos and stories were also splashed across the website, direct mail and elsewhere. The point is that both No on Prop. 8 and No on 1 campaigns got at least 47 percent of the vote, but No on 1 proved you don’t have to hide these families. You can win the cautious way, or you can win in a way that advances attitudes on LGBT issues, and No on 1 chose the right model for future campaigns.
In addition, we moved the ball forward on attitudes around marriage. There are people I met in Maine who told me they went from a “no special rights”-type attitude to being supportive of civil unions. It’s not marriage, but it’s a step in the right direction and it would have never happened if the “we can’t win at the ballot” folks had their way and we never tried at all.
Just like our parent, friend or colleague who takes time to become comfortable with your sexual orientation or gender identity, folks will get there. And we must get involved to help them along.
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